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1. Introduction 
Corruption, defined as “the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain or for the benefit of a 
group to which one owes allegiance” (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 1997), has been shown to 
produce detrimental effects on society, democracy and the economy (Moran, Flanary, & Doig, 
1999, Quah, 2001). Whereas it is widely considered a critical issue to be addressed both in 
developed and developing countries, there is no single measure that alone can curb corruption. 
Several institutions must work together to fight it (Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998, Borge, 1999). 
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) are considered to be one of the so called “integrity pillars” 
of the policy response against corruption (Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998; Borge, 1999; Tackett, 
2010; Noussi, 2012). SAIs contribute to the effective management of public spending, ensure 
transparency in the use of public funds, financial accountability and strengthen the democratic 
institutions (Blume & Voigt, 2011; Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2001). Transparency and 
accountability are important to prevent public sector corruption, while effective auditing helps 
to reduce misrepresentation and provide assurance for accounts to be trusted (Dye, 2007). 
The international pressures towards SAIs having a more active anticorruption role are 
increasing from institutions such as the World Bank (Dye, 2007), the OECD (OECD, 2002) 
and the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) (Borge, 1998). 
The INTOSAI, in particular, which provides a forum for state auditors, has shown a growing 
commitment in promoting anti-corruption audit practices in SAIs (Stapenhurst & Langseth, 
1997; Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998; Borge, 1999; Stapenhurst & Titsworth, 2006), launching an 
anticorruption program (IDI, 2016) and publishing, in 2016, a new standard (ISSAI 5700) 
Guideline for the Audit of Corruption Prevention.  
This puts SAIs in a peculiar situation, since they are often reluctant to take a comprehensive 
role in fighting corruption (Kayrak, 2008), and when they do, their efforts seem to be ineffective 
(Goetz & Jenkins, 2001). In many cases, SAIs appear to limit their role to prevent corruption 
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through their audits, while seeing corruption detection and investigation as being outside the 
scope of their activities (Dye, 2007; Kayrak, 2008). They leave the responsibility for the 
anticorruption work of detection and investigation to administrative, judicial and police 
authorities (Dye & Stapenhurst, 1998; Dye, 2007). This situation may be related to the lack of 
a clear mandate for SAIs to take an active role against corruption (IDI, 2017), creating a gap 
between stakeholder expectations and audit mandates (Dye, 2007). Researchers have warned 
about the risk of a widening expectation gap in public sector auditing (Kells, 2011) between 
SAIs’ anticorruption activity and stakeholders’ views of their role (Dye, 2007). While SAIs 
may show a growing interest in fighting corruption, their capacity to do so nevertheless remains 
uncertain, since both their mandate and investigative power are limited (Dye, 2007; Kayrak 
2008). Meanwhile, empirical research about the effectiveness of public sector auditing related 
to corruption is scant, with only a few articles discussing the relationship between SAIs’ 
activities and corruption (Gustavson & Sundström, 2016). Gustavson and Sundström (2016) 
suggest that having SAIs that are independent, professional, and good at communicating audit 
results to Parliament and the public is associated with a low degree of public sector corruption. 
An effective SAI also relies on an effective Parliament (OECD 2002; Smith 2006) and a free 
and independent media that can publish its audit findings (González-Díaz, García-Fernández, 
& López-Díaz, 2013). 
What we do not know, however, is why individual SAIs do the work they do against corruption 
and how they perceive this work to be supported or challenged within their environments (Kells, 
2011). In other words, we lack an understanding of how SAIs perceive their responsibilities to 
work against corruption in the context of an unclear mandate and increasing stakeholder 
expectations and institutional pressures (Dye, 2007). Research on how SAIs work against 
corruption is now being called for by anticorruption specialists (Evans, 2008). Therefore, this 
paper aims to explore how SAIs perceive institutional pressures to fight corruption and how 
those pressures contribute to variations in the work they perform. To do so, in the paper we 
compare the cases of Scandinavian, South-European and African SAIs. The sources used to 
collect data are interviews complemented with written material from SAIs of seven different 
countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Uganda and Zambia). The three cases were 
chosen for their cultural and geographical inter-group diversity and intra-group similarities. The 
Scandinavian and African countries have national audit offices while the South-European 
countries have courts of auditors, and the three groups represent countries with low 
(Scandinavian), medium (South-European) and high (African) levels of corruption (Noussi, 
2012; Transparency International, 2018).  
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The paper contributes to extant SAIs and corruption literature by providing a nuanced view of 
the possible explanations of the local variations in anti-corruption work of SAIs. In particular, 
we show how the roles adopted by SAIs in fighting corruption cannot simply be explained by 
the level of corruption of the specific countries, but rather reflect the ways in which coercive, 
mimetic and normative pressures combine and interact with the institutional logics guiding the 
SAIs work. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section describes previous 
research on public sector auditing, the fight against corruption and our theoretical framework, 
drawing on institutional approaches to look at SAIs’ work against corruption. The third section 
describes the method employed, and the fourth section describes the country contexts and 
institutional settings. The fifth section includes the results of our empirical work, and the sixth 
section presents an analysis and discussion of the SAIs’ work against corruption. In the seventh 
and final section, we discuss the main conclusions and contributions of the paper. 
 
2. An institutional approach to SAIs’ work against corruption  
2.1. Isomorphic pressures and SAIs  
Many features of contemporary institutions derive from worldwide models constructed and 
propagated through global cultural and associational processes. These models and the purposes 
they reflect are highly rationalized, articulated, and often consensual. Worldwide models are 
norms that define and legitimate agendas for local action, shaping the structures and policies of 
nation states and other national and local actors (Scott & Christensen, 1995; Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). In the context of SAIs, INTOSAI is the institution that provides 
such worldwide models and standards. INTOSAI has assumed considerable levels of legitimacy 
and power in recent decades, as have other international standard-setting institutions 
(Humphrey, 2008). After more than 70 years of operations, INTOSAI has gone from issuing 
non-binding auditing standards, to drawing up the Framework of Professional Pronouncements 
that contains a comprehensive set of International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions 
(ISSAIs) and INTOSAI guidance on good governance (INTOSAI GOVs). This framework was 
approved by all INTOSAI members during INTOSAI’s 20th congress held in Johannesburg in 
2010. ISSAIs consist of two types of standards: General Auditing Guidelines on Financial 
Audit; and General Auditing Guidelines on Compliance Audit and Performance Audit. In 
addition, INTOSAI GOVs provide principles and pronouncements relating to internal control 
and accounting. Their purpose is to foster good governance in the public sector. 
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The INTOSAI framework aims to provide SAIs with permanent access to a common, broad 
framework of up-to-date auditing standards to add credibility to their auditing, and to improve 
their professional image (Elmose, 2011). SAIs must use this framework for public sector 
auditing, and implement it, both nationally and regionally, in accordance with national 
mandates and legislation (González-Díaz & García-Fernández, 2018). However, although 
SAIs’ work is subject to international regulation, there is often a great deal of adaptation to 
local expectations, particularly related to performance auditing (Jeppesen et al., 2017). In its 
Guideline for the Audit of Corruption Prevention in Government Agencies, INTOSAI also 
includes other mechanisms for controlling corruption, such as setting up an organizational unit 
for corruption prevention, cooperating with anticorruption agencies, conducting risk analyses, 
and establishing codes of conduct within organizations. 
Consequently, a SAI’s work in relation to corruption is likely to be affected by a combination 
of: pressures to follow the norms in society; pressures to follow acknowledged professional 
practices; and pressure to benchmark against other SAIs. For this reason, we draw on neo-
institutional theory (NIT) to study SAIs’ work against corruption. Institutional theory is 
considered appropriate when trying to explain both individual, organizational, administrative 
and accounting practices (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). 
Individuals and organizations act according to predetermined, accepted patterns that are 
considered legitimate by society or other institutional actors. As an example, political support 
of anticorruption culture affects the efficacy of anticorruption practices (Abdulai, 2009). Neo-
institutional theory explains the diffusion of social order by reference to three types of pressures 
that make an organization isomorphic with its environment: coercive pressure, normative 
pressure, and mimetic pressure (Scott, 1995).  
Coercive pressure is the social pressure to follow existing norms in society. These norms may 
be informal, or they may be formal, in the form of laws and regulations. Informal coercive 
pressure includes expectations from the media and the public to address corruption, while 
formal coercive pressure exists in laws and regulations that bind SAIs to consider corruption in 
their work. We look both at the informal norms regarding expectations to fight corruption in 
society, as well as the formal regulations such as the organization of the SAI and its mandate to 
fight corruption. In countries where a high degree of corruption is politically accepted, the SAI 
is not likely to be able to focus on corruption without being politically sanctioned. At the same 
time, the general public may have very high expectations that the SAI will work to fight 
corruption.  
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Formal norms are related to the choice of a SAI’s organizational model. There are two 
competing models for SAIs’ organization: the audit office model and the court of auditors 
model (Noussi, 2012). The choice of model has implications for the SAI’s power and mandate 
in the fight against corruption. The audit office model is centered around the auditor-general’s 
responsibility to periodically report to Parliament, which appoints the auditor-general, and to 
assess the financial statements and the operations of government entities. In the court of auditors 
model, however, the auditor-general functions as a magistrate charged with a mission to try 
those who deviate from agreed-upon standards. Audit evidence must be able to stand up in trial, 
and the SAI’s focus will thus be on compliance with laws and regulations, rather than with 
performance and the 3Es: economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Therefore, the traditional 
mandate in the latter model provides an added dimension that those SAIs without judicial 
functions do not have: it allows people who have misused public funds to be put on trial. If the 
law mandates a SAI to work against corruption, the court model could be effective in fighting 
corruption. If not, the office model may be more flexible for auditors to be able to address this 
issue. 
Normative pressures stem from professional groups in SAIs. These pressures shape behavior 
and practices through civil servants’ internalized moral beliefs and obligations and/or 
formalized codification of behavior such as auditing standards. SAIs employ auditors from a 
breadth of professional backgrounds. Audits on financial statements come from the 
accountancy profession, which is very homogenous when surveyed on commitments to 
different value statements, such as independence or commercialism (Carrington, Johansson, 
Johed, & Öhman, 2013). This indicates a strong degree of professionalization. Auditors trained 
in the private sector may take this identity with them to the public sector when hired to do public 
sector financial audits. However, SAIs also often employ auditors from other professional 
backgrounds, such a lawyers or social scientists, like economists (Jeppesen et al., 2017). Public 
sector auditors thus have diverse professional backgrounds and standards, which could affect 
the perception of their role in the fight against corruption. Jeppesen (2018) reports how private 
sector auditors accept the responsibility in the International Standards on Auditing to detect 
material fraud, but exclude corruption from the definition of fraud, and relegate it to the 
category of “non-compliance with laws and regulation”, which the auditor should understand 
and discuss with management in order to decide whether it should be reported to appropriate 
authorities. Public sector auditors, on the other hand, include some types of corruption in the 
concept of “abuse”, which they need to pay attention to when planning the audit. Therefore, the 
present public sector auditing standards do not have a clear position on an auditor’s role in the 
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detection of corruption. This allows SAIs a great deal of freedom in determining their 
anticorruption role. Just as auditors guided by the financial auditors’ standards are keen to 
define themselves away from responsibilities involving corruption, we would expect SAIs in 
which an audit profession is dominant to be less oriented towards fighting corruption. In 
addition, normative pressure is,  also exerted by INTOSAI, which increasingly expects the SAIs 
to work to fight corruption. 
Mimetic pressure relates to imitating the actions of other organizations that appear to be 
legitimate within their environment. There are two such pressures that can be identified for 
SAIs. First, there is a mimetic pressure to imitate the lead model for the organizational type of 
SAI. The audit office model is also known as the Westminster model. In the Scandinavian 
countries there has been a tendency to imitate the UK National Audit Office, at least in the past 
(Jeppesen, 2012). Similarly, in the South-European countries, we may expect a tendency to 
imitate the Cour des Comptes model, since it originates from former regimes in France, Italy 
and Spain. Finally, in the African countries we may expect to find imitation of the former 
(British) colonial power’s way of organizing a SAI. As argued earlier,  with the adopted audit 
model, the SAI may inherit a particular role in working against corruption. Second, the 
Scandinavian SAIs are investing heavily in capacity building in SAIs in developing countries, 
and this may, in theory, lead the SAIs of some developing countries to imitate the perceived 
role of the Scandinavian SAIs. The obvious risk of mimetic isomorphism is that organizational 
structures that make sense in one context are uncritically transferred to another context. This 
occurs where the practices of the SAI in a country with no corruption are uncritically imitated 
by a SAI in a country with high levels of corruption. Mimetic pressure is also exerted through 
peer reviews (SAIs collaborating with other SAIs) and through capacity building programs 
(partly organized by the SAIs themselves through the INTOSAI Development Initiative,1 but 
also by organizations like the World Bank). The recent standard ISSAI5700 was set to support 
SAIs in “preparing and conducting audit anticorruption policies and procedures in government 
organizations” (INTOSAI, 2016, p. 5), 
 
2.2. Institutional logics and SAIs 
One of the core elements of institutional theory is that the way organizations strive to achieve 
legitimacy by complying with their institutional environment (Dacin et al., 2002).Thornton and 
Ocasio (1999) argue that institutional theory should not only look at isomorphic behavior but 
also at the effects of institutional logics both at the macro and micro-organizational level 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). Institutional logics are logics of appropriateness where 
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social actors are driven by social norms rather than by a logic of consequence. An initiative will 
be refuted if it does not relate effectively to the way professionals make sense of their world 
(Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014). The institutional pressure to introduce anticorruption auditing 
practices will thus have little effect if the implicit values and norms supporting the status quo 
are continuously supported. 
Institutional logics influence the roles auditors decide to play. Based on extant literature, five 
roles are available: the judge, the public accountant, the management consultant, the 
management accountant and the researcher (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014). According to 
Reichborn-Kjennerud (2016), the above roles can be related to three main professional 
institutional logics: the evaluator logic, the auditor logic and the legal logic. Auditors embrace 
an evaluator logic when they start out from a research (or audit) question, construct a study 
design to answer the questions, analyse and discuss collected data and finish by answering the 
questions and drawing conclusions. The public accountant, management consultant, and 
management accountant draw on an auditor logic. The auditor logic is based on professional 
standards, and assesses whether collected data are reported in line with agreed upon principles 
and codes of practice. Finally, judges and lawyers will apply the legal logic. Their activities are 
guided by the legal framework, with a limited discretionary leeway. 
 
3. Methodology and approach  
This study applies a qualitative design of a collection of case studies. This method is considered 
appropriate to examine contemporary issues in specific contexts (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 
1987, Eisenhardt, 1989, Styles & Genua, 2008, Yin, 2009, Weerawardena, McDonald, & Mort, 
2010). Given the exploratory nature of our research (Cavaye, 1996, Darke, Shanks, & 
Broadbent, 1998, Rowley, 2002, Yin, 2009, Van Thiel, 2014) and the limited understanding of 
how SAIs work to fight against corruption (Monteduro, Hinna, & Moi, 2016, Tara, Gherai, 
Laurentiu, & Matica, 2016), the case study method is considered most suitable. Our study is 
mainly based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with managers and senior auditors, as 
well as on documents, in order to obtain an overview of how SAIs work to fight corruption. 
 
3.1. Cases selection strategy 
We selected our cases through purposive sampling of different and similar cases that could 
illustrate the paper’s theoretical interests (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The cases demonstrate 
cultural and geographical inter-group diversity and intra-group similarities.  
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Our cases were selected based on perceived levels of public sector corruption and the 
organizational structure of the SAIs. Tara et al. (2016) showed that SAIs contribute to 
improving government efficiency and that they have a significant influence on perceived levels 
of corruption. These same authors confirmed the results of their predecessors, Blume and 
Voight (2011), demonstrating that the organizational model also influences government 
efficiency and perceived levels of corruption. Corruption levels are significantly higher in those 
countries whose SAI presents an organizational structure based on a judicial or Napoleonic 
model: in other words, the SAI organized as a Court. 
Unlike quantitative studies where researchers can use random sampling, the researcher can 
make a purposive selection (Van Thiel, 2014, p. 90) to generate information-rich cases in 
qualitative studies (Patton, 2002). In our study, aimed at investigating the mechanisms 
employed by Scandinavian, South-European, and African SAIs to fight corruption, the SAIs 
were deliberately selected considering three criteria: the two mentioned above (perceived level 
of corruption and organizational model) and the accessibility or availability of information 
(Rowley, 2002, Amaratunga et al., 2011).  
Seven SAIs were selected for the study. The three SAIs from the Scandinavian countries 
represent strong SAIs (Noussi, 2012), with national audit offices, in a context with little 
perceived corruption. The South-European SAIs from Spain and Italy are of medium strength 
(Noussi, 2012), with a court model, in a context with moderate corruption. The two African 
countries, Uganda and Zambia, have comparatively weak SAIs (Noussi, 2012), with office 
models, existing in a corrupt environment (Persson, Rothstein, & Teorell, 2013). 
 
3.2. Data gathering and analysis 
The main source of data for the three cases was interviews. Data from official documents 
(informative material published by SAIs and aimed at the general public such as annual reports, 
official handbooks, and brochures). Newspapers and documents provided by the institutions 
themselves were also collected and analyzed. 
Thirty-two semi-structured interviews (lasting normally from 45 to 90 minutes) were conducted 
with managers and senior auditors in 2014 and 2015 (see Table 1), allowing a free-flowing 
conversation (Van Thiel, 2014). 
An interview manual was designed, and a protocol was followed to guide the discussion, with 
questions on how SAIs perceive their role, their way of organizing to fight corruption and 
factors that may strengthen or weaken SAIs’ commitment to fight corruption (Qu & Dumay, 
2011; Van Thiel, 2014; Maroun & van Zijl, 2016). 
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The number of interviews ranged from one to thirteen in each SAI, depending on accessibility, 
resources, and time available (Rowley, 2002). In the case of Spain and Zambia, the number of 
informants was higher because the staff was more accessible. Three of the authors were well 
known by the interviewees because of their research on SAIs.  
Interviews were recorded on audio when possible (seven interviewees did not want to be 
recorded). Notes were also taken during the interviews (Flick, 2009; Kvale, 2008). The 
transcripts of the interviews and the notes taken were summarized and analyzed, as were the 
personal interpretations and reflections of the researchers (Momin & Parker, 2013). The 
information was collated into tables, which helped simplify and systematize data analyses into 
thematic categories (Maroun & van Zijl, 2016). 
 
[Table 1. in about here] 
 
We also performed an individual descriptions of all SAIs before comparing similarities and 
differences between the three cases (Crowe et al., 2011). 
 
4. Country contexts 
The SAIs analysed in our study vary considerably with regards to institutional and 
organizational characteristics and resources. Tables 2 and 3 portrait very diverse country 
contexts both in terms of level of perceived corruption, SAIs’ financial and human resources, 
institutional form, legislative provision, the nature of the audited organizations and functions. 
Denmark and Sweden, for instance, despite being in the top position in terms of integrity and 
anti-corruption, are among the lowest spending countries in their SAIs and with a number of 
SAIs’ employees per 1000 inhabitants at the level of Zambia and Italy. On the contrary in 
Norway, another well performing country as per corruption index, the SAI has the largest 
number of employees per inhabitant - twice as many as the Italian and the Danish SAIs and 
almost three times the Swedish one. The Zambian SAI, which has 355 auditors and a total staff 
of 528 people, has a similar ratio to Sweden’s. The Spanish and Ugandan SAIs are the countries 
with the lowest number of employees per inhabitant. Expressed in terms of total government 
spending, however, a somewhat different picture emerges. Uganda is the SAI with the greatest 
annual budget—relative to total expenditure, while Zambia is near to the level of Denmark. The 
Norwegian SAI has the next highest budget relative to the country’s public expenditure. The 
opposite is true for the Spanish SAI that spends little relative to the government total 
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expenditure. There are also noticeable differences among the southern European SAIs. The 
percentage of the government total expenditure in Italy is almost twice as high as in Spain. The 
SAIs annual budgets is five times higher in the Italian SAI than in the Spanish SAI, but with a 
worst performance in terms of corruption index and ranking. See the tables below. 
 
[Table 2. in about here] 
 
[Table 3. in about here] 
 
In the following sub-sections, we will describe in more details the context of the Scandinavian, 
South-European and African SAIs. 
 
4.1. The Scandinavian SAIs 
The Danish, Norwegian and Swedish SAIs are all organized as Offices of the Auditor General. 
Their Auditor General is appointed by the Parliament for a period of four to seven years. The 
Scandinavian SAIs audit mainly State expenditure. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are all top 
ranked in the world with least corruption in the Transparency International corruption index 
2018, ranking respectively 1st, 3rd and 7th out of 180 countries and with corruption scores well 
above 80/100.  
Before 2003, the Swedish SAI was an evaluative institution of the government. This may 
influence the way it interprets its role. The Swedish SAI is more inclined to use an evaluator 
logic when auditing (Bringselius, 2013). This entails taking on a researcher role using methods 
from the social sciences (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014). The Danish SAI identifies primarily 
with an auditor logic in the way it is performing its tasks. In its performance audits it takes on 
the role as “management accountant” checking the internal control system, testing controls if 
possible (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014). The Norwegian SAI balances between an evaluator and 
an auditor logic in its performance audits. It both checks internal control systems, but it also 
aims to investigate the outcome of the use of state expenditure (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013, 
2014, Jantz, Reichborn-Kjennerud, & Vrangbaek, 2015). The professions working in the 
Scandinavian SAIs are mainly financial auditors and university graduates with diverse social 
science backgrounds (Jeppesen et al., 2017).  
 
4.2. The South-European SAIs 
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In both Italy and Spain, the SAI is referred to as a Tribunal. It can audit both state and local 
expenditure. In Spain, the auditor-general is appointed by the Parliament. The Tribunal 
proposes the auditor-general, who is then ratified by the King. In Italy, the government chooses 
among existing magistrates to propose the auditor-general, who is appointed by the President 
of the Republic. The Auditor-General holds his/her position until retirement. By INTOSAI 
standards, in light of the appointment process, the independence of the Italian SAI may be 
considered questionable. However, the fact that the president holds a permanent and 
independent position from the government is seen as contributing to safeguarding the SAI’s 
independence. The Spanish SAI reports to Parliament, decides its own audits and proposes its 
own budget and staff numbers to the parliament. The 12 board members are elected by the 
Parliament, based on political majorities. This may inhibit its independence in practice, despite 
its formal independence (Vila, 2014). 
The South-European countries are in an intermediate position in terms of their perception of 
corruption. In the 2018 corruption perception index by Transparency International, Spain 
ranked 41 out of 180 countries. Spain ranks relatively well. It is close to the top fifth of countries 
with the lowest levels of corruption. Italy has recently improved in almost all international 
rankings of corruption. In Transparency International’s 2018 corruption perception index, Italy 
ranked 53 out of 180 countries. However, the number of judicial convictions and sentences for 
corruption decreased between 1996 and 2006, which may indicate either an improvement, or 
possible difficulty in detecting corruption. 
The South-European SAIs are organized according to the Napoleonic system, which is a judicial 
system based on legal trials and compliance with laws and regulations. The South-European 
SAIs mainly employ magistrates and lawyers, due to their status as courts (tribunals). The 
South-European SAIs, therefore, do not conduct extensive performance audits, since their work 
must follow the legal framework. This means that the auditors’ focus is limited to issues of 
compliance with accounting laws, instead of issues of effectiveness and combatting corrupt 
activity in the public sector. In both Spain and Italy, the legal logic tends to dominate 
magistrates’ audit work that is organized according to the legal framework and overall 
mandates. 
 
4.3. The African SAIs 
Like the Scandinavian SAIs, the African SAIs in this study are organized along the Westminster 
model. However, in the African countries, the Auditor General is appointed by the president 
and holds his/her position until retirement. Based on the INTOSAI standards, therefore, the 
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African SAIs could be criticized for having a hampered independence. Zambia is considered 
corrupt, according to Transparency International’s 2018 analysis, in which it ranks 105 out of 
the 180 countries in the study. Uganda ranks 149 out of 190 and is thus considered even more 
corrupt than Zambia. In Zambia and Uganda SAIs can audit both state and local expenditure.  
In African countries SAIs often lack the independence, resources and technical skills to carry 
out the rigorous high-quality audit needed (Wang & Rakner, 2005). In addition, they are 
embedded in countries with questionable democratic systems (Wang & Rakner, 2005). The 
legal systems and the Parliaments are weak and lack sufficient independence to hold the 
government and the ruling party to account (Chipenzi et al., 2011). Wang and Rakner (2005) 
showed how SAIs from Uganda and sub-Saharan countries have a lack of human capacity and 
technology with limited expertise and skills to carry out adequate performance audits. However, 
the SAIs in Zambia and Uganda are considered relatively well functioning SAIs despite their 
structural and organizational weaknesses particularly in terms of competences and technical 
supports. They are populated by auditors and this motivate the presence of an auditor logic in 
the way SAIs organize their work, following professional norms and standards. 
Both in Zambia and Uganda, the SAIs are organized as offices and are focused primarily on 
financial and compliance audits, but they also conduct forensic, IT, and performance audits.  
The Office of Auditor General Zambia is well respected within the Government of Zambia and 
the region. Its reports are used as the basis of Parliamentary proceedings and criminal 
investigations by organizations such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, Drug Enforcement 
Commission, and the police. The Ugandan SAI mainly employs lawyers, auditors and IT-
experts, while the Zambian SAI has hired mostly financial auditors with accounting 
certifications and training.  
 
5. The work against corruption  
5.1. The Scandinavian SAIs 
In the Danish SAI there is no individual or organizational unit in charge of combatting 
corruption. The Danish SAI is historically influenced by the financial auditor profession 
including their stance that corruption is not within the scope of auditors to deal with (Reichborn-
Kjennerud, 2014). As the director-general in the Danish financial auditor department states: 
Suspecting corruption is outside of an auditor’s line of thinking. We focus on internal control and 
manipulation of accounts at best. It’s in our culture. 
 
The Danish SAI does not have employees responsible for these tasks, neither does it consider 
that combatting corruption is within its scope. The same director-general said:  
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The audit isn’t focused on it. … Our role … is to secure that the state financial accounts are correct. 
The logic behind this (non-)work against corruption in Denmark cannot fairly be explained in 
terms of coercive or mimetic pressures. Rather, normative isomorphic pressures shape the 
choice to not actively pursue work against corruption in Denmark. This is due to the Danish 
SAI’s strong affiliation with the financial audit profession, a profession that famously avoids 
fighting corruption (Jeppesen, 2018). 
Different from Denmark, in Norway, the Parliament is specific about expectations of how the 
SAI should work, as evidenced in the organization and resourcing of the SAI. 
The Parliament signaled, even before the 2004 law was decided, that the Norwegian SAI was expected 
to do more to combat corruption.  
The work against corruption in Norway is thus primarily the result of coercive pressures 
compelled by legal reforms in 2004: 
The year [before] the 2004 law was sent to Parliament, the Group of States Against Corruption 
interviewed us. They pointed to the fact that, in many countries, SAIs collaborate with other 
organizations to fight corruption. We integrated that into §9 of the law. 
Fighting corruption was also prioritized through the Scandinavian collaboration. After that we 
organized the work against corruption with 2.5 positions. 
The 2004 law §9 specifies that the Norwegian SAI should contribute to preventing and 
uncovering corruption.2 This makes it mandatory by law for auditors to look for corruption. 
 
The Swedish SAI investigates cases when it suspects corruption, or when suspicions of 
corruption are reported to it – up to, but not beyond the point where the police or a public 
prosecutor would be expected to start an investigation. The Swedish SAI has dedicated 
employees working actively on this task, as the following quote suggests: 
In our investigations, we aim to do what we can to support a possible future investigation by prosecutors 
and the police. 
This means that the Swedish SAI does more than what is usually the case for audit offices 
around the world, yet it does so from a supportive role and as a means of streamlining reports 
to government authorities. The Swedish SAI discards the forensic investigation model, which 
they believe competes too much with, and potentially could get in the way of other corruption-
fighting agencies such as the police. As our informant argued: 
We must be careful so we don’t jeopardize a future prosecution by destroying information. 
Instead, the Swedish SAI has chosen a third in-between model allowed by ISSAI 1240, in which 
the auditor investigates suspicions of crime not as the police would, but judging whether this is 
a case the police and prosecutors would be interested in, hence functioning as a filter. It assesses 
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whether suspicions could be reported, or whether authorities should investigate these 
suspicions. The Swedish SAI has two dedicated case handlers that follow up on suspicions of 
corruption. They work closely together with the police and coordinate their activities. As 
expressed by the experts interviewed at the Swedish SAI: 
When a person becomes a suspect of the police, we stay well away from that person. 
This approach is mirrored in the methodologies employed: 
We keep strictly to normal audit methods. We, for instance, do not interrogate people. 
The institutional pressures forming the logic behind the Swedish SAI’s work against corruption 
can hence be described as a mix of normative pressures. Although, difficult to quantify, the 
work described above can easily be placed within the long tradition of public sector institutions 
(described in an earlier section), where the role of the SAI is to support other government 
activities. Although the Swedish SAI employs many financial auditors, it also employs others 
with a more traditional public sector background. This qualifies the SAI’s work against 
corruption and also counterbalances a ‘pure’ financial audit identification, as found in Denmark. 
Hence, although the respondent directly cites adherence to ISSAI 1240, this does not indicate 
a strong coercive pressure, but rather as a way to justify what they do, to appear rational 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in the context of INTOSAI as an expression of “worldwide cultural 
rationalization” (Meyer & Bromley, 2013 p. 366). 
 
5.2. The South-European SAIs 
The South-European SAIs’ mandates are influenced by the fact that they are courts, mainly 
populated by magistrates and lawyers (the Spanish SAI employing also auditors). Since they 
are courts, the normative pressure comes from the legal profession and their way of thinking. 
They have a jurisdictional function and are independent from the Parliament. This can be a 
strength, as they can sanction directly, but also a weakness because they end up using political 
accountability mechanisms involving the Parliament to a lesser extent. All their assessments 
must be based on laws and give them narrower leeway in what they can focus on in their audits. 
As one Spanish informant expressed when explaining how the legal framework inhibits what 
they can do:  
For instance, when auditing job training, we should check whether the courses are actually carried through 
or not (instead of only looking at accounts). What we need is to focus on how public funds are managed 
(through performance audit). 
Any opinion on the reason for irregularities, be it corruption, is outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction  
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This is also the case for Italy, where the Court of Auditors can prosecute corruption only if there 
is an infringement of the law, and this infringement causes damage to public finances. The 
Court of Auditors has the constitutional and statutory duty to pursue cases in which there is an 
improper use of public funds. In that case the court can fine, but it will have to be able to 
quantify the damages to do this. If a procurement contract was signed because of a bribe, the 
magistrates still need to demonstrate that the public administration involved would have paid 
less without the bribe: 
How can I quantify the damage caused by bribery? Sometimes we have convicted persons, whose illegal 
activities are not quantifiable understood as damage to public finances. 
The Italian SAI is not by statute oriented to the task of fighting corruption. As the Italian 
informant expressed it: 
The court does not have an explicit objective, nor dedicated personnel to fight corruption. 
The organization of the SAIs as courts of auditors makes them more immune to worldwide 
rationalization influenced by the INTOSAI. The court’s documents cite INTOSAI’s Lima 
Agreement when referring to the court’s role to fight corruption demonstrating that there is still 
peer pressure and a wish to do more against corruption. This challenges the traditional role of 
the magistrates and lawyers, which is limited to ensure laws are upheld in court cases. A Spanish 
auditor explains how they try to handle this situation through dissemination:  
The Tribunal is stepping up its efforts to disseminate its reports. This helps to put pressure on managers. 
And it contributes to prevention: 
The Tribunal benefits from the media being interested in its work. The fact that it reports on the Tribunal’s 
work is useful for prevention. 
Recurring audits contribute to prevention. For every audit, the Tribunal checks whether or not 
recommendations have been followed up on. 
However, the South-European SAIs do not want to be too visible. As expressed by one of our 
informants in the Spanish SAI:  
The Tribunal doesn’t hold press conferences even though it would be useful if […] journalists could ask 
for the results of audits, at least for major reports like the General State Financial Accounts. 
And 
A major dissemination job is needed. We need to appear in the media and explain what the Tribunal de 
Cuentas is all about and change the jargon into a language that people can understand. We could have 
explained what the tribunal’s purpose I betters. Communication has been awful. 
The Italian Court of Audit still seems to have a similar challenge with Court’s reports being 
underutilized and underreported. The information seldom reaches the wider public. Our 
informant puts it this way: 
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Our inspection reports are not considered or even read by the stakeholders (…) there is the need to improve 
the communication of our findings and results, suggestions. 
As the quotes illustrate, auditors wish to expand the work against corruption beyond the court, 
by seeking influence and impact via media strategies. 
The South-European SAIs also face other pressures to do more to fight corruption, from recent 
corruption scandals. Coercive pressure from the public may cause conflicting logics where 
pressure to uphold the letter of the law and nothing more comes into conflict with the public’s 
requests of “doing the right thing”. In the Italian case, the pressure to fight corruption was 
strengthened in 2012 with the approval of Law N° 190. As explained by our informant: 
Before 2012, the Court was not focusing on corruption, but on the correct use of national and European 
funding […] Nowadays, the Court is considered a pillar of the integrity system against corruption. 
The regulatory framework, together with the creation of the Anticorruption Agency (ANAC) 
(Law 190/2012) is making pressures to increase the legitimation of the Italian Court. The 
ANAC has, nevertheless, only preventive functions and administrative power. It cannot convict. 
That is a statutory role of the judicial power. If the ANAC detects evidence of corruption or 
other criminal activities, it has to hand over the evidence to the judiciary power. According to 
our informant, ANAC is perceived primarily a symbolic act: 
The role of the anticorruption agency is unclear. To be honest it was founded to reassure the public and the 
international institutions that steps were taken to fight corruption in Italy. 
In the case of Spain, despite the lack of a clear mandate to anticorruption activities, the 
interviews bring to light the Tribunal need to show that it is actually fighting corruption, even 
though it is outside of its formal responsibility because of large corruption scandals. According 
to the OECD Public Governance Reviews (OECD, 2014), Spain is a “low trust country”. The 
loss of confidence by the general public in central government is not solely due to the failing 
economy which led to an increase in unemployment and public sector cutbacks. Spanish public 
opinion considers the political situation to be bad and, according to data from the Centre for 
Social Research Survey (CIS, 2015), corruption is regarded as the second major problem after 
unemployment. Corruption cases have involved both elected politicians at every level of 
government and representatives in the main political parties. A recent peer review of the 
Spanish SAI nevertheless concluded that the Tribunal should do more against corruption 
(Portuguese Court of Auditors & European Court of Auditors, 2015). Also following this peer-
review, the Spanish auditors consider that they could fight corruption more effectively with 
certain amendments to the law. This would represent a broadening of their mandate. As they 
say: 
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With some changes to the Act of the Spanish Court of Audit, for example concerning the collaboration 
between institutions such as the Bank of Spain, the social security department, suppliers and the Tax Office, 
the Court could fight corruption more effectively. 
Informants from the Spanish SAI feel the need for more employees with specific 
responsibilities related to the prevention and detection of corruption. This would be particularly 
relevant concerning valuation of land sales. As one of our interviewees put it:  
We could use another prosecutor. We need someone with competence in doing valuations and appraisals 
because local government is financed from land sales. 
 
The ways in which the South-European courts of auditors conduct their work is a result of their 
traditional court organization. The fight against corruption is dictated, or better limited, by the 
laws the SAIs not only have to follow but also uphold and is further informed by the legal 
professional logics disseminated in the organizations. Informal coercive pressures through the 
media can nevertheless move SAIs to prioritize the work against corruption.  
 
5.3. The African SAIs 
In the African SAIs work against corruption can be described as institution building (UN, 2015). 
Fighting corruption is not only about upholding the law, but about bringing about change in 
society. In Uganda, corruption scandals are a major driver to fight corruption. Our informant 
gave us an example of a scandal where funds disappeared from a pension fund. As he expressed 
it: 
The reason why we started the forensic unit was because we responded to scandals. A lot of money has 
been lost in the government.  
The Ugandan SAI sees the media as its ally in this fight, as the political leadership and the 
Parliament are often corrupt. The pervasiveness of corruption does not mean it is a preferred 
logic of doing business. Rather, corruption is often understood as a result of low-quality 
government (Rothstein, 2011).  
It is not surprising, then, that in Zambia, one of the main allies of the Office of the Auditor 
General is the media. Still, members of the Public Accounts Committee in Parliament noted 
that the news media gives only limited exposure to the findings of the auditor-general’s reports, 
because the media companies only want headlines that sell newspapers. In Uganda, which has 
a weak Parliament, the SAI describes the media as their main ally. Members of the Public 
Accounts Committee of the Zambian Parliament and the auditor-general also said that the media 
were key allies in their fight against corruption. Informal coercive pressures are therefore in 
place in both Uganda and Zambia. 
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In the interviews, respondents from the Zambian SAI talked about INTOSAI as a source of 
standards/norms. This indicates that mimetic pressures are primarily from world models and 
standards, which may  explain why the African SAIs have built up forensic units – in the 
Ugandan SAI, this includes as many as 50 employees. If SAIs suspect corruption, they are, as  
in Sweden, supposed to hand the case over to bodies with mandates to investigate and prosecute. 
Being former British colonies, Uganda and Zambia have both adopted the Westminster model 
of how to organize a SAI. This mimetic pressure has steered the African SAIs away from the 
court model, thus making them similar to the Scandinavian SAIs. Scandinavian SAIs’ also have 
extensive programs of so-called capacity building, which have provided the African SAIs with 
strong incentives to adapt aspects of audit work considered desirable by the Scandinavian SAIs.  
The handover of issues to investigatory and prosecuting bodies often lead to coordination 
issues. As expressed by our Ugandan informant:  
If the SAI investigates corruption, it is important that the other players also move fast so the case is 
prosecuted in court. They should deal with it in reasonable time. 
In Zambia, the auditors get involved when they see evidence of corruption, in the process of 
their auditing, or when they are asked to investigate possible cases of corruption from the 
ministries themselves, whistleblowers, or donors who suspect corruption is taking place. After 
evidence of corruption has been uncovered and recorded, it is taken up by other agencies that 
have prosecutorial power, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Drug Enforcement 
Commission and the police. These agencies rely on the auditor-general’s reports as the basis of 
their investigations. Members of the Zambian SAI as well as Transparency International 
Zambia talked about the recurring challenges of coordination between the SAI and the Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC). They described cases that, in spite of overwhelming evidence, 
were not prosecuted. As exemplified by the quote below, the auditor-general has been harsh in 
her criticisms when speaking to the news media about these types of challenges.  
In most cases, like the letters that ACC has been sending us of late, they say we are not able to prosecute this 
case anymore because the documents are all missing. Now we wonder; how did they go missing if we gave 
them a whole file, a whole lot of those documents, for them to use?  
We provide them with evidence but you will find that the matter will take years for them to prosecute.  
This is yet another example of how the overall quality of government affects the level of 
corruption, and by extension the SAI’s ability to combat it. 
The African SAIs recruit mainly from financial audit but. Unlike Denmark, this does not mean 
that they exclude corruption from their job description. This is probably because of the 
difference in the general level of corruption between Africa and Scandinavia. If corruption is 




The different SAIs we have investigated are more or less dedicated to fighting corruption and 
more or less limited by their environment to prioritize this work. Their attitude towards the 
work in combating corruption will be analysed through the lenses of the institutional theory 
adopted. 
 
6.1. Mimetic pressures to fight corruption 
The expectation that African SAIs imitate the Scandinavian SAIs in the way they organize to 
fight corruption is not obvious in our data. Although similarities in form (e.g. the Westminster 
model) exist, from the interviews, it seems that the African SAIs are more active fighting 
corruption than the Scandinavian ones. This is not surprising considering Uganda and Zambia 
are the two countries with the highest level of corruption. Apparently these SAIs are not backing 
out from addressing corruption because of pressure from a corrupt environment. The African 
SAIs face conflicting institutional logics. The politicians want them to turn the blind eye to 
corruption, whereas the public and international organizations such as INTOSAI expects them 
to audit against it. So, a natural outcome is to tip the news media and use press revelations of 
corruption as an excuse to audit.  The question is nevertheless whether their efforts to curb 
corruption would be accepted if they were highly effective in their pursuits. In corrupt countries 
placed in the bottom of transparency Internationals annual index, corruption is a norm 
throughout society. This will incline all institutions to be corrupt. If they still were able to fight 
corruption effectively, this would be a good example of how norms in society can be changed 
through organisation and institution building (cf. Rothstein, 2011, UN, 2015). As our data is 
based on interviews and official documents, this study cannot reveal whether the African SAIs’ 
efforts to fight corruption are symbolic to satisfy donors or if they actually address the problem 
of corruption effectively. Challenges in the coordination with other agencies, such as anti-
corruption agencies and prosecutors, (an area where we do see some similarities between at 
least one Scandinavian country—Sweden—and the African countries) will also likely influence 
the efficiency of the SAIs anti-corruption efforts.  
The Spanish Tribunal faces some mimetic pressures. In 2014, this institution underwent a 
voluntary peer review, which addressed independence, transparency and governance, as well 
as other more specific issues related to its mandate. This peer review also seeked to improve its 
credibility with stakeholders. The review was led by the European Court of Auditors together 
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with the Portuguese Court of Auditors, both chosen by the Spanish Tribunal for their expertise, 
experience, and good practices in the areas to be evaluated. The peer review recommended the 
Tribunal to develop a communication strategy. This may also explain why the auditors working 
in the Spanish Court seem more oriented to the fight against corruption. 
 
6.2. Coercive pressures to fight corruption 
Surprisingly SAIs in more corrupt environments do not automatically address corruption more, 
because, then we should find the South-European SAIs being more active than the Scandinavian 
SAIs, but less active than the African SAIs (which we do not). Hence, clearly, the level of 
corruption is, in itself, not enough to explain the SAIs’ work against corruption. Coercive 
pressures through the SAIs’ legal framework may explain why the South-European SAIs are 
the least effective in making an effort to fight corruption. The South-European SAIs cannot do 
much work against corruption even if they wanted to (which we have indications in the 
interviews that they do). The legal institutional framework effectively hinders any such 
attempts. The Corte dei Conti and the Tribunal de Cuentas are, as their names imply, courts. 
This means that their audits follow a legal logic that guides these SAIs toward focusing on 
compliance and financial audit. Therefore, performance audits are not being performed and 
work against corruption is only undertaken when it is found that a law has been violated. This 
means that any work against corruption is reactive rather than proactive. Proactive action is 
prohibited by the fact that all assessments must be based on laws. The legal logic, determined 
by the legal institutional framework in the South-European countries is what most clearly 
distinguishes them from the other SAI’s in the study, which are constituted after the 
Westminster office model, in contrast to the Napoleonic court model in the South-European 
countries.  
The Spanish Tribunal de Cuentas faces others coercive pressures with respect to its Italian 
counterpart. In the Spanish Tribunal there is nevertheless, since 2013, some coercive pressure 
through the Transparency Act to better disseminate the Tribunal’s work. Besides, the 2014 peer 
review of the Spanish Tribunal together with a strong media pressure increased the expectations 
for a more active role against corruption. This may also explain why the auditors working in 
the Spanish Tribunal consider anticorruption more as a part of their audit practice. In the case 
of Italy, in 2012, the government passed a new anticorruption law and established the ANAC, 
but this organization only provides administrative regulations and guidelines. The new 
anticorruption Law and the existence of the ANAC may be considered forms of coercive 
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pressure upon the Italian court, but this seems not to have much influence on the work against 
corruption. 
Informal coercive pressures coming from the media and the public at large emerged as a 
relevant factor influencing the SAIs’ work. Expectations to fight corruption from the African 
media and the public may explain why they put more effort into the task, through for example 
organizing forensic units. Informal coercive pressures can therefore be found in the African 
SAIs, where the legal framework tend to be weak. The same applied, to a lesser extent, in the 
case of Spain where the recent scandal pressured the SAI to take a more active role. The 
Scandinavian countries that have the best scores on Transparency Internationals’ Corruption 
index apply the more flexible evaluator logic in their performance audits. They do not face 
equally strong expectations from the media and the public to prioritize anti-corruption work. 
Within the investigated SAIs, the only example of formal coercive pressure is represented by 
Norway. The Norwegian SAI, in fact, faces coercive pressures as the law obliges the auditors 
to look for cases of corruption. This imply a formal role attributed by law against corruption. 
 
6.3. Normative pressures to fight corruption 
Normative pressure seems to play out in our data mainly through mechanisms of professional 
institutional logics. The Danish SAI —similar to the South-European SAIs—does not do any 
work against corruption, although the cultural and institutional framework is very similar to the 
other Scandinavian SAIs. There seems to be no coercive and mimetic pressure on the Danish 
SAI. The institutional logic rather seems to be normative pressure: the SAI is part of the external 
auditing profession and is therefore not auditing against corruption. In Norway and Sweden, 
corruption was taken seriously and special anti-corruption units were formed. The interviews 
with auditors working in the Norwegian and Swedish SAI also reflect the importance attributed 
to work against corruption. This is not so, however, in Denmark where the auditors distance 
themselves from work against corruption, arguing that this line of work is beyond their 
professional responsibilities. Different from Norwegian and Swedish auditors, the Danish 
auditors more closely identify themselves as financial auditors with the auditor logic (Jantz et 
al., 2015). And similar to how private sector financial auditors are reluctant to accept the 
responsibility to report suspicion of crime (Larsson, 2005), the Danish auditors do not see it as 
their responsibility to work against corruption. There is nevertheless a clear division of 
responsibilities between the audit institutions and the prosecutorial and law-enforcement 
institutions. This is perhaps most clearly pronounced by the respondents in the Swedish SAI 
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who stress the importance of adhering closely to standard audit methods and not stepping over 
the line where the audit work could interfere with police work.  
The external normative pressure exerted by INTOSAI and from other standard setter institutions 
appeared to be relevant, and of most help, in the case of African SAIs as the INTOSAI 
represented a source of legitimation as well as of skills and knowledge. In the African SAIs, 
the professional logic does not seem to limit their work against corruption. However, one 
important hindrance to their work is other actors’ failing to follow up on the SAIs investigations. 
As illustrated above, this can lead to cooperation difficulties. 
In the Italian and Spanish case, the INTOSAI nevertheless also has effect. In many of the Court 
documents the INTOSAI principles is cited to argue for the Courts’ role to fight corruption. 
However, the professional and legal environment counterbalances this. The legal logics of the 
South-European SAIs is reflected in the professions that the SAIs employ (e.g. magistrates and 
lawyers). Only the national legal framework can affect the practices, and the INTOSAI 
standards do not have any legal and professional binding in this contexts. This partly explain 
why Scandinavian and African SAIs are freer in fighting against corruption than the Spanish 
and Italian SAIs.  
 
6.4. Summing up 
Table 4 below sums up what appears to influence the SAIs’ work against corruption.  
 
[Table 4 in about here] 
 
The SAIs in which the auditor logic is dominant seem to be less oriented towards fighting 
corruption, unless there are diverse institutional pressures at place. In the case of African SAIs, 
despite the presence of an auditor logic, the presence of coercive, normative and mimetic 
isomorphic behavior provides an explanation for their fight against corruption.  In both Uganda 
and Zambia the situation seems is helped by the coercive pressures from the media and the general 
public. The African SAIs are, from a normative perspective, much influenced by the INTOSAI’s 
standards. 
The legal logic in the Court’s magistrates prevent them from fighting corruption and there is 
little pressure to counterbalance this. In the case of Spain, the peer-review moved the SAI to be 
more active in its role to fight corruption. The 2012 anticorruption Law in Italy, was meant to 
help the corruption work, but has had little impact. Instead the SAI has been influenced by 
normative pressures from INTOSAI’s Lima Agreement. There are strong normative pressures 
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from professional groups particularly in Italy and Denmark, to not engage in the fight against 
corruption. 
The Norwegian and Swedish SAIs seem to be in an intermediate position where they negotiate 
diverging institutional pressures. In the Norwegian case, there was coercive pressure from a 
law, while in the Swedish SAI is influenced by INTOSAI standards. In these two cases, the 




In this paper, we have undertaken an analysis of how variations in work against corruption by 
SAIs can be understood through coercive, normative and mimetic pressures. We performed this 
study with the observed tension between a reluctance of SAIs to get involved in the fight against 
corruption and a simultaneous acceptance of an expectation of them to act on these matters 
(Dye, & Stapenhurst 1998; Kayrak 2008). How this tension plays out in and among those 
charged with performing audit work against corruption is largely unexplored by previous 
research, which makes the contributions of this study two-fold. 
Firstly, the empirical descriptions of the work performed by SAIs in the seven countries 
explored in this study add a nuance not found in the more structured previous research on public 
sector corruption and audit work. The variety of conceptions of their roles and responsibilities, 
their strategies, the support and challenges described by our targeted sample of respondents 
paints a picture of considerable local variation to the world model provided by INTOSAI. At 
the same time, the picture painted affirms the influence of the world model (Meyer et al. 1997; 
Scott and Christensen 1995) which is constantly being referred to – as in the wishes of the 
South-European auditors or the reference made to the ISSAIs by the Swedish auditors.    
Secondly, we demonstrate how institutional pressures contribute to the variation in the 
empirical picture. By comparing three cases—Scandinavian, South-European and African 
SAIs—we illustrate that the difference in the work performed against corruption by SAIs is not 
(only) related to the level of corruption in the country at hand. Instead we found that differences 
in the work SAIs perform against corruption can be better understood through analyses of the 
professional identities and legal framework observed in the three cases. 
The relatively limited work against corruption performed by many SAIs can thus be 
explained in one of the two following ways (or a combination of them). First, if the logic of the 
auditors working at the SAI is similar or the same as that of professional private sector financial 
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auditors, as illustrated by the Danish SAI, auditors tend to see corruption as outside the scope 
of their work. In other SAIs, auditors may not perceive this scope limitation, but they still may 
not do much or any work against corruption for other reasons. This second reason is caused by 
the SAIs legal framework. In the South-European countries, this legal framework is expressly 
manifested in them being courts rather than offices and we here see examples, such as in Spain, 
of auditors wanting to do more but are prohibited by this framework. 
There are several implications to be drawn from these findings. The first, and perhaps most 
obvious, is that there is no single factor that can be used to explain why SAIs do (or do not) 
pursue a particular strategy in their work against corruption. It must be acknowledged that the 
study of audit work against corruption is at an early stage. More work, quantitative as well as 
qualitative, is needed to substantiate and bring nuance to our understanding how institutional 
pressures contribute to the variation in the work performed by SAIs against corruption. The 
influence of INTOSAI still appears to be limited, and it needs an increased institutional 
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